Hong Kong’s Money Laundering Offence: Two Problems by Young, SNM
Title Hong Kong’s Money Laundering Offence: Two Problems
Author(s) Young, SNM
Citation
A Joint Centre for Comparative and Public Law, the University of
Hong Kong & University College London Conference: Financial
Crime, Risk and the Rule of Law, The University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong, 23 November 2015
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/237299
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Hong Kong’s Money Laundering 
Offence: Two Problems 
Professor Simon N.M. Young 
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong 
 
23 November 2015 
Problems the Courts Cannot Solve 
Problem 1 
The Objective Fault 
Standard 
 
 
Problem 2 
The Sanction-Blame 
Mismatch 
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Problem 1 
The Objective Fault Standard 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Runs up against subjectivist trend 
– Subjective recklessness 
• Misconduct in public office (Sin Kam Wah (2005 CFA) 
• Gross negligence manslaughter (Lai Shui Yin (2012 
CFI) 
– Presumption of mens rea 
• Half-way house defences of honest and reasonable 
belief (Hin Lin Yee (2010 CFA); Kulemesin (2013 
CFA)) 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Tension seen in Pang Hung Fai (2014 CFA) 
 
“There is no need for an abstract personification for 
purposes of their application. Similarly, these words can 
be applied directly and do not need further 
characterisation as ‘objective’.” [49] 
 
“[T]here is a significant mens rea element in the second 
limb of the offence…On the above analysis, there is a 
strong element of moral blame.” [57] 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Tension seen in Pang Hung Fai (2014 CFA) 
 
“…the accused had grounds for believing; and…anyone 
looking at those grounds objectively would so believe” 
[52] citing Seng Yuet Fong (1999 CFAAC) 
 
“The two mental elements in the subsection should be 
understood as if they read: ‘knew or ought to have 
known’” [56] 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Tension seen in Pang Hung Fai (2014 CFA) 
 
“…the accused had grounds for believing; and…anyone 
looking at those grounds objectively would so believe” 
[52] citing Seng Yuet Fong (1999 CFAAC) 
 
“The two mental elements in the subsection should be 
understood as if they read: ‘knew or ought to have 
known’” [56] 
But what was the legislative thinking behind 
“having reasonable grounds to believe”? 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Legislative History (Ad Hoc Group 1989) 
 
1. DTROP Bill 1989: “knowing or suspecting” (based on 
English DTOA 1986) 
 
2. Group Proposal: “believing” (originating from HKAB) 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Legislative History (Ad Hoc Group 1989) 
“the Group asked Government to consider a further 
alternative submitted by HKAB, that is to replace the word 
‘suspecting’ with ‘believing’. 
 
Government has resisted this… 
 
(a) To prove belief requires a much higher standard… 
(c) … The proposed amendment would fundamentally affect 
the effectiveness of the scheme. 
(d) To amend the clause as proposed…would be interpreted 
by the international community as weakness…and may give 
rise to criticism that Hong Kong is enacting ineffectual 
legislation…” (Narcotics Division, 21 June 1989) 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Legislative History (Ad Hoc Group 1989) 
DTROP Bill 1989: “knowing or suspecting” 
 
Compromise: “having reasonable grounds to believe” 
 
Group Proposal: “believing” 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Legislative History (Ad Hoc Group 1989) 
 
“…the wording brings in an objective rather than 
subjective test as to the person’s state of mind.  Thus, 
while under the ‘belief’ formula people are likely to turn 
a blind eye to suspicious circumstances, the effect of 
the ‘reasonable grounds to believe formula will be for 
people to report suspicions to play safe. To the extent 
that the latter will still encourage or oblige people to 
report, it will achieve, albeit to a lesser extent, the 
objective of clause 25 and is considered an acceptable 
compromise.” (Narcotics Division, 21 June 1989) 
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1. The Objective Fault Standard 
• Problem is that s. 25(1) has an objective fault 
standard, and only law reform can change this 
• Some defendants will fail to live up this 
standard (eg they “ought” to have known; “anyone 
looking at those grounds objectively would so believe”, even 
though Ds did not) 
• Too much subjectivity in determining “those 
grounds” would appear to be inconsistent with 
the legislative intent behind not adopting a 
‘believing’ standard 
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Problem 2 
The Sanction-Blame Mismatch 
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Two Kinds of ML Offences 
1. Predicate-Based 
• Culpability lies in aiding 
predicated offenders to 
retain the proceeds of 
crime 
• Proof of predicate 
offence and actual 
proceeds matter 
• Reporting suspicion, a 
separate matter 
unrelated to liability 
• Punished severely given 
close connection to 
predicate 
2. Risk-Based 
• Culpability lies in failing 
to act prudently when 
exposed to the risks of 
money laundering 
• Proof of risk indicators 
more important than 
predicate offence/actual 
proceeds 
• Reporting encouraged 
and provides an excuse 
• Punished less severely 
as less blameworthy 
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2. The Sanction-Blame Mismatch   
• Problem is that s. 25(1) tries to address both 
predicate-based and risk-based ML under a 
single severe criminal sanction 
• Only law reform can disentangle these two 
forms into separate offences. 
• Law reform can also consider the feasibility 
of having only civil sanctions for risk-based 
ML. 
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THE END.  THANK YOU. 
Simon N.M. Young 
Professor and Associate Dean (Research) 
Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong 
Barrister-at-Law, Parkside Chambers 
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